

1327
SECRET

Liaison
BRITISH RESIDENT'S OFFICE

AMMAN

TRANS-JORDAN.

S	999	47
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(2nd packet)

FO 816 | 113

SUBJECT:

Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of 1948.

GPP. 9731-1000-11-3-40

CONNECTED FILES

NUMBER AND YEAR

5/83/45

SUBJECT

Anglo-T.J. Treaty of 1946.

(2nd packet)

S	999	47
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Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of 1948.

(1)

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY
THE KING OF THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM
OF TRANSJORDAN AND HIS BRITANNIC
MAJESTY IN RESPECT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan and His Britannic Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas.

Animated by the most sincere desire to consolidate the friendship and good relations which exist between them and to establish these relations on the foundations best calculated to ensure the development of this friendship;

Desiring to conclude a new Treaty of Alliance with these objects and in order to strengthen by co-operation and mutual assistance the contribution which each of them will be able to make to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,

His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan:

His Excellency Tewfiq Pasha Abul Huda, Jewelled Order of the Nahda, First Class Order of the Istiqlal, Prime Minister.

His Excellency Fauzi Pasha el Mulki, Second Class Order of the Istiqlal, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas (hereinafter referred to as His Britannic Majesty):

for/

for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland:

Sir Alec Seath Kirkbride, C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.,
his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

who having exhibited their full powers found in
good and due form have agreed as follows :-

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship
between His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of
Transjordan and His Britannic Majesty.

A close alliance shall continue between the High
Contracting Parties in consecration of their friendship,
their cordial understanding and their good relations.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes
not to adopt in regard to foreign countries an attitude,
which is inconsistent with the Alliance or might create
difficulties for the other party thereto.

ARTICLE 2.

Should any dispute between either High Contracting
Party and a third state produce a situation which would
involve the risk of a rupture with that State, the High
Contracting Parties will concert together with a view to
the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations and of any other international obligations
which may be applicable to the case.

ARTICLE 3.

Should either High Contracting Party notwithstanding
the provisions of Article 2 become engaged in war, the
other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the
provisions of Article 4 immediately come to his aid as a

measure/

measure of collective defence.

In the event of an imminent menace of hostilities the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence.

ARTICLE 4.

Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to, or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or under any other existing international agreements, conventions or treaties.

ARTICLE 5.

The present Treaty of which the Annex is an integral part shall replace the Treaty of Alliance signed in London on 22nd March 1946 of the Christian Era, together with its Annex and all Letters and Notes, interpreting or otherwise exchanged in 1946 in connexion therewith, provided however that Article 9 of the said Treaty concerning a Commercial and Establishment Agreement shall remain in force in accordance with and as modified by notes exchanged this day.

ARTICLE 6.

Should any difference arise relative to the application or interpretation of the present Treaty and should the High Contracting Parties fail to settle such difference by direct negotiations, it shall be referred to the International Court of Justice unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

ARTICLE 7/

ARTICLE 7.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall come into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at London as soon as possible. It shall remain in force for a period of 20 years from the date of its coming into force. At any time after 15 years from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will at the request of either of them, negotiate a revised Treaty which shall provide for the continued co-operation of the High Contracting Parties in the defence of their common interests. The period of 15 years shall be reduced if a complete system of security agreements under Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations is concluded before the expiry of this period. At the end of 20 years, if the present Treaty has not been revised, it shall remain in force until the expiry of one year after notice of termination has been given by either High Contracting Party to the other through the diplomatic channel.

In witness whereof the above named plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in Amman, this 15th day of March, 1948 in the Arabic and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ANNEX.

ARTICLE 1.

(a) The High Contracting Parties recognise that, in the common interests of both, each of them must be in a position to discharge his obligations under Article 3 of the Treaty.

(b) In the event of either High Contracting Party becoming engaged in war, or of a menace of hostilities, each High Contracting Party will invite the other to bring to his territory or territory controlled by him the necessary forces of all arms. Each will furnish to the other all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of all means and lines of communication, and on financial terms to be agreed upon.

(c) His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan will safeguard, maintain and develop as necessary the airfields ports, roads, and other means and lines of communication in and across the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan as may be required for the purposes of the present treaty and its annex and will call upon His Britannic Majesty's assistance as may be required for this purpose.

(d) Until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the state of world security renders such measures unnecessary, His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan invites His Britannic Majesty to maintain units of the Royal Air Force at Amman and Mafrek airfields. His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan will provide all the necessary facilities for the accommodation and maintenance of the units mentioned in this paragraph, including facilities for the storage of their ammunition and supplies and the lease of any land required.

ARTICLE 2/

ARTICLE 2.

In the common defence interests of the High Contracting Parties a permanent joint advisory body will be set up immediately on the coming into force of the present Treaty to co-ordinate defence matters between the Governments of the High Contracting Parties within the scope of the present Treaty.

This body, which will be known as the Anglo-Transjordan Joint Defence Board, will be composed of competent military representatives of the Governments of the High Contracting Parties in equal numbers, and its functions will include :-

- (a) The formulation of agreed plans in the strategic interests common to both countries.
- (b) Immediate consultation in the event of any threat of war.
- (c) The co-ordination of measures to enable the forces of either High Contracting Party to fulfil their obligations under Article 3 of the present Treaty and in particular measures for the safeguarding, maintenance and development of the airfields, ports and lines of communication referred to in Article 1(c) of this Annex.
- (d) Consultation regarding training and the provision of equipment. The Joint Defence Board shall submit annual reports thereon and recommendations to the Governments of the two High Contracting Parties.
- (e) Arrangements regarding the joint training operations referred to in Article 6 of this Annex.
- (f) The consideration of and if necessary recommendation for the location of His Britannic Majesty's forces at places in Transjordan other than those provided for in Article 1(d) of this Annex.

ARTICLE 3.

His Britannic Majesty will reimburse to His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan all expenditure which the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan may incur in connexion with the provision of facilities under Article 1(c) and (d) of the present Annex and will repair or pay compensation for any damage due to the actions of members of His Britannic Majesty's armed forces, other than damage caused in military operations undertaken in accordance with Article 3 of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 4.

His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan agrees to afford on request all necessary facilities for the movement of units of His Britannic Majesty's forces in transit across the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan, with their supplies and equipment, on the same financial terms as those applicable to the forces of His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan.

ARTICLE 5.

Pending the conclusion of an agreement between the High Contracting Parties defining in detail the jurisdictional and fiscal immunities of members of the forces of His Britannic Majesty in the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan, they will continue to enjoy the immunities which are accorded to them at present, including the provision that, in accordance with the established principles of international law governing the immunities of sovereigns and sovereign states no demand will be made for the payment by His Britannic Majesty of any

Transjordan/

Transjordan taxation in respect of immoveable property leased or owned by His Britannic Majesty or in respect of his moveable property, including customs duty on goods imported or exported by or on behalf of His Britannic Majesty. The privileges and immunities to be extended to the units and personnel of the armed forces of His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan visiting or present in British territory shall be defined in similar agreements on a reciprocal basis.

ARTICLE 6.

In order that the armed forces of the High Contracting Parties should attain the necessary efficiency in co-operation with each other and in view of the desirability of establishing identity between the training and methods employed by the Transjordan and British forces respectively :-

- (1) His Britannic Majesty offers appropriate facilities in the United Kingdom and in any British colony or protectorate administered by the Government of the United Kingdom for the training of the armed forces of His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan.
- (2) His Britannic Majesty will make available operational units of his armed forces to engage in joint training operations with the armed forces of His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan for a sufficient period in each year.
- (3) His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan agrees to make available facilities in the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan for the purposes of this joint training.

- (4) His Britannic Majesty will provide on request any British service personnel whose services are required to ensure the efficiency of the military units of the forces of the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan.
- (5) His Britannic Majesty will (a) afford all possible facilities to His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan for the military instruction of Transjordan officers at schools of instruction maintained for His Britannic Majesty's forces, and (b) provide arms, ammunition, equipment and aircraft and other war material for the forces of His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan.
- (6) His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan will (a) meet the cost of instruction and equipment referred to in paragraph 5(a) and (b) above, (b) ensure that the armament and essential equipment of his forces shall not differ in type from those of the forces of His Britannic Majesty, (c) send any personnel of his forces, that may be sent abroad for training, to military schools, colleges and training centres maintained for His Britannic Majesty's forces.

ARTICLE 7.

His Majesty the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan gives permission for ships of His Britannic Majesty's Navy to visit the ports of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan at any time upon giving notification to the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/999/47. ✓

TELEGRAM.

4

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

To :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. 12

Despatched 30.3.48 (16.35)

Received

No. 193 of 30th March, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Anglo-Transjordan Treaty.

A package addressed to the Transjordan Legation London containing the Transjordan instrument of ratification of the new treaty is contained in the bag which left here by King's Messenger to-day. The Prime Minister of Transjordan has requested that the exchange of the instruments should take place as soon as is possible in order to give finality to the whole affair.

(HDLem/HA).

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/999/47. ✓

TELEGRAM.

5

Cypher

Code

Clear

J/R &

From :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

To :—S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 31/3/48 (11.12)

Received

No. 196 of 31st March, 1948.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.196 of 31st March.

Repeated for information to Damascus	No. 17
Baghdad	No. 39 SAVING.
Beirut	No. 45 SAVING.
Cairo	No. 43 SAVING.
Jeddah	No. 39 SAVING.
B.M.E.O.	No. 41 SAVING.
Jerusalem	No. 53 SAVING.

SECRET.

Syrian reactions to Anglo-Transjordan Treaty.

1. Prime Minister of Transjordan informed me yesterday that he has ordered the Transjordan Legation in Cairo to hand a formal note to the Syrian Legation there (in default of direct diplomatic relations) protesting against the personal attacks on the King and the Government of Transjordan which have been made over the Syrian broadcasting station and in the Syrian press since the conclusion of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty and asking that this action which will affect adversely the relations between the two countries should be stopped.

2. Commenting the Prime Minister said that if this campaign did not stop he would retaliate by something more than abuse. He obviously means a revival of the Greater Syria agitation.

9

(ASK/HLM/HA).

FILE NO. S/999/47.

✓ TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP

Code

Clear

From :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

To :— H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 4/4/48 (17.42)

Received 4/4/48 (19.00)

No. 203 of 3rd April, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your telegram No. 193.

It would be difficult for us to ratify before the treaty has lain on the table of the House for (1) 21 Parliamentary days.

This period will expire (1) on April 23rd and we would be prepared to exchange ratifications as soon as possible after that date.

(JS/HLM/HA).

7

HM
To
Sec
12/8/48
2nd edn
FORN OFFICE

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

Clear

Savingram Out

BEIRUT



17

SAVING

1st April, 1948

Repeated to:-

Amman	No. 19	)
Bagdad	No. 18	)
B.M.O.	No. 13	)
Cairo	No. 20	)
Damascus	No. 14	)
Jedda	No. 17	)

SAVING

146 12/8/48

Addressed to Foreign Office Saving telegram No. 17 of April 1st, repeated for information to Amman, Bagdad, B.M.O., Cairo, Damascus and Jedda.

My telegram 217 of 20th March.

Press comment on Anglo-Transjordan Treaty.

More papers have now expressed opinions which in the main are favourable.

2. Several papers published news items of anti-Treaty demonstrations in Damascus and Bagdad in general terms but the only paper to quote in full was the French language paper "L'Orient". The Pro-Soviet "Telegraph" is definitely critical.

3. The Nationalist paper "An Nahar" published a cynical article on the 23rd, the next day however it commented favourably. The Nationalist press generally is in favour of the Treaty and says that while it may not be ideal it is the most expedient step to take in view of the increased tension between East and West and is an improvement on the old treaty. "As-Sahafit-Tayeh"



/in ...

2.

in an outspoken article refers to the Syrian Prime Minister's recent proposals at the Arab League Political Committee's meetings which he suggested a general directive for Arab policy vis-à-vis foreign powers and the paper says the Arab States should be bold enough to follow in King Abdullah's footsteps and conclude individual treaties with Great Britain.

DISTRIBUTION:

1. Chancery.
2. H.M.M.
3. Library.
4. I.O.
- 5 - 11. Saving copies.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/999/47.✓

TELEGRAM.

(8)

Cypher

Gode

Clear

Handwritten:
H.M.
To 12/4/48
Sec 2/4/48

From :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

To :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 7.4.48 (13.02)

Received

No. 211 of 7th April, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(6)

Anglo-Transjordan Treaty.

Your telegram No.203 (of 3rd April, 1948).

1. You will doubtless be approached by Transjordan Minister in London about date of exchange of ratifications. *(128 1st)*
2. I trust that the exchange of royal messages referred to in my telegram No.160 (of 16th March, 1948) will be possible. As exchange of ratifications is taking place in London should not initiative come from there.

(ASK/CJB/HA).

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/999/47.

TELEGRAM.

9

Cypher M/OTP

Code

Clear

From :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

To :— H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 6/4/48 (18.20)

Received 6/4/48 (19.15)

No. 204 of 5th April, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

5 2nd Jacket

Addressed to Amman telegram No. 204 of April 5th.

Repeated for information Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo Jedda and B.M.E.O. JJO

Your telegram 196.

While I recognise that the Transjordan Government are being seriously provoked by attacks in the Syrian press and wireless I very much hope that they will not take this(1) as an excuse to revive the Greater Syria agitation. Any such action would only intensify the Syrian attacks. The Transjordan Government would have put themselves equally in the wrong by intervening in another country's affairs whereas at present the right is on their side. Apart from this the present time seems most INAPPROPRIATE for the reviving of this dispute between the two Arab states which we had been glad to note was in abeyance. You will no doubt speak to the Transjordan Prime Minister on these lines if you think it desirable.

10

Copy to:- S/766/43.

(CJB/PW/HA).

(U/T)

FILE NO. S/766/43.

TELEGRAM.

10

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :— H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

To :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 8.4.48 (16.40)

~~Received~~

No. 217 of 8th April, 1948.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram

No. 217 of 8th April.

Repeated for information to Damascus

No. 21

Baghdad

No. 43 SAVING.

Beirut

No. 49 SAVING.

Cairo

No. 47 SAVING.

Jeddah

No. 43 SAVING.

B.M.E.O.

No. 46 SAVING.

Jerusalem

No. 58 SAVING.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Transjordan/Syrian Relations.

Your telegram No. 204 (of 5th April, 1948).

1. The Transjordan Foreign Minister will discuss the question of the present Syrian activities with the Syrian Prime Minister during the forthcoming meeting at Cairo of the political committee of the Arab League. The Prime Minister of Transjordan is proceeding to Beirut to-morrow and I have encouraged him to take up the matter in Damascus on his return journey possibly with the President.

2. I have of course counselled moderation and will continue to do so but people here are getting very angry.

Cong to:- S/999/47.

(ASK/HIM/HA).



(E 3423/14/80)

SECRET.



FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

1st April 1948.

11

I w Kirkbride

Although we were somewhat surprised that, as reported in your telegram No.154, the Transjordan Prime Minister refused to accept the very small amendments we wanted to make to the text of the Treaty to avoid specifically excluding the Dominions we decided to let the matter go. It was of course our fault for not getting the wording right before putting it to the Transjordanians at all.

The Legal Advisers moreover considered it was not possible to maintain that we had without doubt included the Dominions by altering the words mentioned in our telegram No.158. And if the amendments did not definitely do what we wanted them to do there did not seem much point on insisting on them.

Yours ever
BAB Burrows
(B. A. B. Burrows)

Sir Alec Kirkbride, C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.,
Amman.

220/40/48

BRITISH EMBASSY,
JEDDA.

April 4th 1948

SECRET

Dear Department,

Please refer to your telegram No.394 of March 18th to Cairo about reactions to the new Transjordan Treaty.

Two issues of each of the two weekly newspapers published in this country have appeared since the publication of the Treaty. The official paper Umm al Qura has made no mention whatsoever of the treaty, while the unofficial paper Al Bilad as Saudiya has merely made a bald announcement that it has been signed, the only comment being that "the negotiations took place in an atmosphere of friendship and good understanding. However we have received, as stated in our letter to you No.9/15/48 of April 4th 1948, a long memorandum from Philby, which we believe to be officially inspired, containing four paragraphs on the new Treaty which seem sufficiently significant to transmit to you in extenso and which are enclosed in this letter.

2. It could not be expected that the Treaty would be received in Riyadh with sentiments other than that the Hashemites have once again shown themselves to be puppets of H.M.G. and the mandatory relation is still in fact in existence. From this, the encouraging deduction is drawn that as long as H.M.G. has special rights in Transjordan, Ibn Saud is prepared to let his claims to Aqaba and Ma'an continue to sleep. This is a change from his original position in May 1946 when he stated that, as the Mandate was at an end, he considered himself free to press his claims. However it does not bode well either for a meeting between him and King Abdullah as two independent and Sovereign Monarchs or for the likelihood of his sanction being given to the representation of Transjordanian interests in Saudi Arabia by a power other than H.M.G. This may be a small price to pay for freedom from a peculiarly intricate frontier dispute in which both sides have sufficiently good grounds to make a compromise impossible and in which H.M.G. has a vital interest.

3. The reference in paragraph 4 to the Hejaz Railway, seems to refer to Article 1(b) of the Annex to the Treaty. Though we believe that the suggestion that the portion of the line between Muduwara and Medina is likely to be put into operation in the foreseeable future is very optimistic indeed, yet the suggestion that H.M.Forces have been given title to the use of Waqf property may one day be used by the Ikhwan section of Arab opinion as yet another stick to beat us. However they probably have enough without digging this up.

Yours ever,

JEDDA CHANCERY.

Eastern Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

1. The ambitions of King Abdullah in respect of Palestine have been referred to above. Whether the terms of the recent treaty between Britain and Trans-Jordan have been influenced by the prospect of his achieving such ambitions or not, they have been rather frigidly received in Arab circles, as evidence of the puppet character of his régime and of the imperialistic designs of Britain. Secretly many people are pleased that the dependence of King Abdullah and his régime on British support and direction is so clearly demonstrated. The ratification of the treaty without submission of the instrument to any kind of popular examination is regarded as evidence of its unacceptable character. In general Transjordan is regarded as the weak link of the Arab League; and Arab sentiment would welcome the restoration of this territory to Syria, in order to consolidate Arab independence.

2. Incidentally King Abdullah's dream of a Greater Syria with himself in the principal role has been effectively dissipated by the Syrian Parliament's unanimous decision to amend the constitution, so as to allow of a second term of office for the present (or any future) President of the Republic.

3. The inclusion in the Transjordan treaty of provisions authorising ships of the Royal Navy to visit the ports of the country at all times is regarded as evidence that Britain's strategic interests in Transjordan necessitate the maintenance of maritime access to the country through Aqaba. Saudi Arabia has never relinquished her claim to sovereignty in the Aqaba-Ma'an area, which might be actively revived in the event of Transjordan becoming really independent. Ibn Saud however has always made it clear that he has no intention of pressing the matter so long as Britain remains effectively in Transjordan.

4. The stipulation in the treaty of Britain's right to use Transjordan section of the Hijaz railway does, however, raise the question of the future of the latter in an interesting, and potentially controversial form, in view of the measures now under consideration for the rehabilitation of the whole line down to Madina (and possibly to Mecca) with a view to Arab international control and management. The Transjordan treaty seems to block any such development; and this aspect of it may be challenged in due course.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

9th April, 1948.

13A

(E 4083/14/80)

My dear Prime Minister,

13B

Thank you very much for your letter of 20th March. I was glad to hear that the new Treaty has been so favourably received in Transjordan and I hope that His Majesty King Abdullah and the people of his Kingdom will continue to derive benefit from the friendship between our two countries, of which the new Treaty is the symbol.

We shall all be very happy to see you in London later on should you decide to come here on a private visit.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/ Ernest Bevin

His Excellency
Tewfik Pasha Abul Huda,

1575
2. Eastern Dept. *13B*
AMM
25/3
E 4083
1 APR 1948

Amman,
20th, March, 1948

Dear Mr Bevin,

On the occasion of signing the Treaty of alliance and its ratification by His Majesty The King of The Hashimite Kingdom, I have the honour to express my thanks to your Excellency and to the members of the Foreign Office, for the good spirit and facilities offered during the negotiations in London, which led to the results that guarantee the interests of both countries, and strengthen the sincere friendship existing between them since the first world war, and makes their future contribution to the cause of the world peace more effective.

The constitution of the Hashimite Kingdom of Trans-jordan does not require - as you know - that treaties should be debated at the Parliament, yet I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that a great majority of the members of the Parliament supported the Treaty after the publication of its texts and expressed their thanks by sending telegrams to His Majesty and His government. Tens of telegrams of satisfaction and pleasure from leaders and distinguished men in the country and from municipal councils, are still arriving to His Majesty and His government. This confirms what I stated to your Excellency during negotiations as to the attitude of Trans-jordan regarding the Treaty.

I hope it will be possible for me to arrange a private visit to London - with my daughter -, where I will be very pleased to have a chance of meeting your Excellency again, and my friends there.

Yours very sincerely
E. Abulhuda



His Excellency The Right Honourable E. Bevin,
The Foreign Secretary,
London.

(W/T)

FILE NO.429/Sec.

TELEGRAM.

14

Cypher ID/OTP

Code-

~~Clear~~

From :— Memin, CAIRO.

To :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 17/4/48 (13.20)

Received 18/4/48 (17.30)

No. 26 of 16th April, 1948.

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.125 of April 16th.

Repeated for information Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jedda, Damascus, and Washington.

118 429/8 (6th)

My telegram No.123 : Anglo-Arab Relations.

During conversation RIADH SOLH said he thought there might yet be trouble over the recent Anglo-Transjordan Treaty.

Foreign Office pass Washington as my telegram No.24.

Copy to:- S/999/47.

(CJB/ILA).

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/999/47.

TELEGRAM.

15

Cypher M/OTP

Code

Gear

From :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

To :—H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 18/4/48 (18.20) Received 19/4/48 (06.00)

No. 227 of 17th April, 1948.

SECRET.

Addressed to Amman telegram No.227 of April 17th.

Repeated for information to B.M.E.O.

Your telegram No.156.

We hope to exchange notifications(1) of the treaty on April 30th or May 4th and subject to your views feel that the first meeting of the joint defence(1) board should take place at Amman soon afterwards. If you see no objection please ask the Transjordan authorities whether May 11th would be a suitable date.

2. If they(1) agree(1) please inform the Transjordan Government that the British Representatives at the first meeting of the board will be Brigadier H.M. LIARD(UN or AM)(1) C.B.E., D.S.O., Group Capt. G.F.Wood OBE., DFC., and(1) Commander(1) A.M. (McKILLOL(TW)), McKILIED (TW) DSC., RN. I will let you know as soon as possible the name of the British Secretary.

3. Your telegram No.150. We have always(1) assured that the Transjordan representation would be as near as possible the same as ours and we think it essential that there should be a Transjordan(1) (Arab) secretary. All written work of the board will(TW) no doubt be in both Arabic and English and there must obviously be an Arabio-speaking secretary to work closely with the Englishmen.

4. We consider it important that the British element of the board should appear to be appointed direct from and report direct to London(1). It will therefore deal direct with the chiefs of staff of the committee but must maintain close liaison with the commanders in chiefs of the Middle East.

5. We realise that if the meeting is held just before May 15th and the Arab Legion re-enter Palestine shortly thereafter we shall be accused of connivance with its re-entry but we shall be accused of this in any case and it might be even more embarrassing to hold the first meeting soon after May 15th. On the whole therefore it seems best to propose the date suggested in paragraph 1 above. But an essential corollary is ~~that publicity should so far~~ that publicity should so far as possible be avoided and I hope you will be able to ensure this.

(HIM/PW/HA)

(W/T).

FILE NO. S/999/47. ✓

TELEGRAM.

16

~~Cypher~~

~~Code~~

Clear

From :— H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

To :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 22/4/48 (11.04)

Received

No. 239 of 22nd April, 1948.

15
Your telegram No. 227 (of 17th April, 1948) about defence board.

Please repeat in clear names quoted in paragraph 2 of your message the cypher was corrupt.

17

(ASK/HA).

MESSAGE FORM

17

W/T Office Serial No. 507
Cipher Office Serial No.

Date 23/4

To:	Amman	TIME OF ORIGIN 23 FEB 1942	TIME OF RECEIPT 0945
From:	Londor	Originators No.	Number of Groups 26

Special Instructions	Indication of Priority 16 (2nd)
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1	23422	Following is repetition	4
2	asked for in your tel 239 begins		8
3	BRIG	H.M. LIARDET CBE., DSO.,	12
4	GROUP	CAPT. G. F. WOOD. OBE., DFC.,	16
5	COMMANDER	A. M. MCKILLIP DSO., RN.	20
6	Bevin.		24
7			28
8			32
9			36
10			40
11			44
12			48
13			52
14			56
15			60
16			64
17			68
18			72
19			76
20			80
21			84
22			88
23			92
24			96
25			100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials
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(W/T)

FILE NO.S/999/47. ✓

TELEGRAM.

18

Cypher

Code

Clear

From:— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

To:— S.OF S. T.O. LONDON.+

Despatched 24/4/48 (17.25)

Received

No. 248 of 24th April, 1948.

IMPORTANT.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.248 of 24th April.

Repeated for information to B.M.E.O. No. 29

SECRET.

Anglo-Transjordan Treaty.

Your telegram No.227 (of 17th April, 1948).

I have consulted the Prime Minister and Glubb about the proposal to hold a meeting of the Joint Defence Board on the 11th May, 1948, without publicity. We are unanimous in thinking that a meeting of Board in the present tense atmosphere which prevails here as a result of current events in Palestine might be harmful. The event could not be concealed and would doubtless give rise to the wildest of rumours here and in adjacent Arab territories.

We would prefer to have the first meeting at some later date which will depend on the way things shape after the 15th of May. In the meanwhile any urgent matter which would normally come before the Board could be dealt with through this Legation.

These considerations do not affect the desirability of exchanging ratifications of the treaty as soon as can be.

I informed the Group Capt of this on the 26.4.48.

(ASK/HIM/HA).

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/999/47.

TELEGRAM.

(19)

Cypher M/OTP

Code

Clear

From :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

To :— H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 30/4/48 (11.45)

Received 30/4/48 (11.50)

No. 272 of 29th April, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.
SECRET. (1)

Addressed to Amman telegram No. 272 of April 29th.

Repeated for information B.M.E.O., Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Washington and UKDEL New York

Your telegram No. 211 not repeated(1) elsewhere.

Anglo-Transjordan treaty.

I intend to exchange ratifications of the new Anglo-Transjordan treaty with the Transjordan(1) Minister at 15.30 hours GMT on Friday April 30th.

2. In view of the very severe pressure which has been felt in Parliament and elsewhere about our relations with Transjordan in the (context - Sic) of ~~the~~ Palestine it is essential(1) that no repeat no(1) publicity(1) shall be given to the exchange of ratifications and we shall not volunteer the idea to the press.

3. We likewise consider to our great regret that it would be most inadvisable to carry out the exchange of Royal messages which had been planned. We therefore trust that King Abdullah will agree that they should not take place.

4. Please explain(1) to King Abdullah how much(1) I regret the circumstances (? which omitted) oblige us to take this line over publicity and the Royal messages. The absence of publicity does not in any way affect(1) friendly relations between us. We hope that it will save us and him from(1) additional unfriendly comment at this critical time.

✓ PW
(JFS/PW/HA).

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/999/47.

TELEGRAM.

(20)

Cypher

Code

Clear

From:— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

To:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 1/5/48 (13.11)

Received

No.

269

of

1st May, 1948.

SECRET.

Anglo-Transjordan Treaty.

Your telegram No.272 (of 29th April, 1948).

I explained the position about publicity and the exchange of royal messages to the King and the Prime Minister today. They both appreciated the position but the former was rather hurt at being deprived of the exchange of messages. I do not however think that any harm was done.

(ASK/HLM/HA).

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/999/47.

TELEGRAM.

(21)

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

To :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched

1/5/48 (10.47)

Received

1/5/48 (11.00)

No.

284

of

30th April, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Amman telegram No.284 April 30th.

Repeated for information to B.M.E.O., Baghdad, Cairo, Beirut,
Damascus, Jedda, Washington and UKDEL New York.

My telegram No.272. (19)

I exchanged the ratifications of the new Anglo-Transjordan
Treaty Alliance with the Transjordan Minister this afternoon.

Cairo pass to H.M.E.O. 27530.

(PW/HA).

[Signature]

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/999/47.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP+

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

To :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 9/5/48 (11.47)

Received 9/5/48 (12.20)

No. 348 of 8th May, 1948.

IMPORTANT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Amman telegram No.348 of May 8th.

Repeated for information to B.M.E.O. Cairo.

Your telegram No.248. — (18)

I agree and regret the delay in replying. Will you and (1)
B.M.E.O. please inform the service authorities concerned.

(JFS/HLM/HA).



FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. (23)

19th May, 1948.

No. 72.

(E 5788/14/80)

RESTRICTED.



Sir,

As I informed you in my telegram No. 284 of the 30th April, I exchanged ratifications of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of Alliance with the Transjordan Minister in London at the Foreign Office on Friday afternoon, the 30th April. The new treaty has therefore been brought into force as from that date.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 of your despatch No. 16 (S/999/47) of the 15th March I shall be glad if you will now send home the second signed copy of the Treaty in your possession for safe-keeping here.

I am, with great truth and regard,
Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

RA B. Brown

(124 / 121)
Sir Alec Kirkbride, C.M.G., O.B.E.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Amman.

RESTRICTED

24

DESPATCH NO. 51.
(S/999/47).

1.3.48
To see 2nd Ge.

BRITISH LEGATION,

AMMAN,

29th May, 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 72 (S 5788/14/50) dated the 19th of May, 1948, and to enclose herewith the second signed copy of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of Alliance of 1948.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect, Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,

(Sgd.) A. S. KIRKBRIDE

The Right Honourable Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

ASK/HA.

23



FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.

31st July, 1948.

(E 8616/8616/G)
TOP SECRET

ME *14* *25*

Dear Pirie Gordon,

Since the despatch of our telegram No. 348 of the 8th May agreeing that the first meeting of the Anglo-Transjordan Joint Defence Board should be postponed, little more has been done on the subject here. But the Chiefs of Staff have now approved a Private Directive to the British members of the Board and I enclose a copy herewith for your information.

Unless the circumstances in which the Board eventually meets are very changed from those at the time of the signature of the new Treaty, this Directive will be the private and secret instructions to the British representatives.

I am sending a copy of this letter with enclosure to the British Middle East Office.



L. F. L. Pyman
(L. F. L. Pyman)

C.M. Pirie Gordon, Esq.,
Amman.

See 5.104/1/50
5.141/5750

(25A)

TOP SECRET

PRIVATE DIRECTIVE FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR THE BRITISH MEMBERS OF THE ANGLO-
TRANSJORDAN JOINT DEFENCE BOARD.

Introduction

1. The Anglo-Transjordan Joint Defence Board has been established by agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Government of TRANSJORDAN and the authority for its establishment is contained in the Treaty of Alliance between the two Governments signed at AMMAN on 15th March, 1948.

Object.

2. The object of the Board is to serve as a joint body to co-ordinate defence matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and TRANSJORDAN within the scope of the present Treaty. In particular your functions will include those set out in Article 2 of the Annex to the Treaty of Alliance.

Purpose of the Board.

3. It is hoped that the Board will prove a valuable influence in maintaining the good relations existing between ourselves and Transjordan. Moreover, it has been decided to set up this Board for the following reasons:-

- (a) It will give expression to the idea of equal status as between GREAT BRITAIN and TRANSJORDAN.
- (b) It is hoped that it will be a first step towards setting up similar boards in all other Arab States.

Bearing in mind the above it is desirable that meetings of the Board should be held quarterly or more frequently as required.

Relationship with Chiefs of Staff and Commanders-in-Chief.

MIDDLE EAST

4. In your capacity as British members of the Joint Defence Board you will be directly under the Chiefs of Staff, and have been officially nominated from London. None the less, since the Commanders-in-Chief are intimately concerned in all matters which you will discuss you must obtain guidance from them.

Channels of Communication.

5. In order to further the above policy, the Board will deal direct with their respective Governments. You are therefore to report direct to the Chiefs of Staff in LONDON. You are, however, to ensure that Commanders-in-Chief, MIDDLE EAST, are kept fully informed of your deliberations. Copies of all recommendations submitted by the Board will naturally be sent to Commanders-in-Chief, MIDDLE EAST, in order to give them an opportunity to comment.

Composition of the Board.

6. The Board consists of equal numbers of British and Transjordan representatives who will sit together in council on an exactly equal status.

7. British representation on the Board is as follows:-

Chairman - Group Captain R.A.F.
Members - Commander R.N. (when required)
 Brigadier Army (when required)
Secretary - Major

It is intended that the Chairmanship of the Joint Defence Board shall alternate between the senior Transjordan and the senior British representative, for periods to be decided by the Board itself. The Board has discretion to decide whether the first Chairman shall be Transjordan or British.

The above organisation is subject to review six months after its inception.

8. The Transjordan representatives will be senior Transjordan officers. It has been agreed that it is not advisable for Glubb Pasha to be a member of the Board, although it is acceptable to have a British officer of the Arab Legion on the Transjordan side of the Board so long as he is not the senior Transjordan representative.

Strategic Importance of TRANSJORDAN

9. In the course of your deliberations, you should bear in mind that TRANSJORDAN is of considerable importance to British strategy in the MIDDLE EAST for the following reasons:-

- (a) It lies astride one of the main lines of approach from the CAUCASUS and the CASPIAN to the SUEZ CANAL and the DELTA.
- (b) It covers the direct route from the head of the PERSIAN GULF to AQABA and thence to the SUEZ CANAL and the DELTA.
- (c) It flanks a possible defensive position across PALESTINE.
- (d) It is an area in which forward air bases could be established. It also lies on the main air re-inforcement route to the East.
- (e) The Arab Legion is the best organised, trained and equipped indigenous force in the MIDDLE EAST. It is much to the advantage of His Majesty's Government to ensure that this force remains in a high state of efficiency since it would prove of considerable value in time of war.
- (f) Should some Arab areas of PALESTINE be absorbed by TRANSJORDAN, strategic facilities available would assume greater importance, particularly with regard to airfields.

Security.

10. There are certain Service matters which you should not disclose to the Transjordan members of the Board. These are:-

- (a) Strategic plans - including cover plans - for the employment of British forces in the MIDDLE EAST not involving the employment of Transjordan forces or requiring their co-operation.

- (b) Internal Security plans for the protection of British forces within Transjordan.
- (c) Sources of British intelligence and methods of obtaining and transmitting it.
- (d) Data on technical and scientific development and performance of weapons or equipment other than that required to meet the military needs of the Transjordan Armed Forces.

Liaison.

11. It is essential that close liaison with the MIDDLE EAST Regional Headquarters and the United Kingdom Diplomatic Representative in TRASNJORDAN should be maintained. It will be through these officers that you will be provided with appropriate information.

TEDDER.
J.H.D. CUNNINGHAM.
MONTGOMERY of ALAMEIN.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.

19th June, 1948.